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Korea Aviation voluntary Incident Reporting System

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Korea Aviation safety voluntary Incident Reporting System

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한국교통안전공단
Korea Transportation Safety Authority

KAIRS Report

Appropriateness Of Flight According To Weather Conditions

〈Report Details〉

While preparing a flight, I made a decision to postpone the departure due to +TSRA (heavy thunderstorm with rain). However, a number of passengers complained about the delay, as other airlines had decided to operate their flights as scheduled. I was under such pressure with these complaints that I was almost unable to make a normal judgment and decision as a pilot in command. At that time, although XX Airport was experiencing the worst flood in decades accompanied with lightning thunder and heavy rain, all flights other than the flight at issue were operated as scheduled. So I, as the pilot in command, happened to question whether it was right in terms of safety to have ground personnel including the towing car work in such heavy rain with lightning and thunder, or let passengers board the aircraft through a step car in such heavy thunderstorm. In many overseas countries such as the United States, Hong Kong or China, once a thunderstorm warning is issued, all sorts of Ground Handling are suspended and the airport is closed. However, as far as I know, there is no such protocol in Korea. It appears to be necessary to develop a protocol or procedures for safety and provide safety training and indoctrination.

• KAIRS Comment :

Accidents resulting from thunderstorms have also occurred in Korea. Although no fatalities have yet been reported, some facilities have been damaged. Please refer to the accident cases below.

Date	Accident Details
July 2, 2009	A maintenance staff member was hit by lightning while towing a passenger aircraft while wearing headphones (light burn injury on the back of his neck)
August 14, 2010	Personnel in charge of loading control fell down from the top of the lower deck to the elevator due to lightning during handling.
August 10, 2013	A ramp handling staff member was hit by lightning just before detaching the intercom at the taxiway starting point after pushback.
July 23, 2017	The surface of a taxiway between ramps was partially damaged by lightning.

Currently, if a low visibility situation occurs, the airport operator issues a low visibility alarm in a phased manner, to provide advance information that will allow each airline carrier to make the optimal decision for its safe flight operation. Similarly, for circumstances that are directly related to safety such as thunder and lightning, strong winds or heavy rain, a communication system to provide notifications regarding the situation should be maintained, and measures should be prepared to ensure that the airport operator can provide prior information. In addition, as issues on which the airport operator should make decisions require consultation with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, such issues need to be raised to the review committee at the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport for discussion.

KAIRS Report

Cabin Crew's Overtime Duty

〈Report Details〉

I am in charge of cabin scheduling and got off work at around 11:00 on Month Date after checking flight schedules and making sure that all crew members for all flights were present and accounted for. At about 11:15, I was contacted by the Air Operation Control Center(OCC) and told that an ambulance was on the way as one of the cabin crew of Flight XXX was suffering a sudden heath problem and an alternate cabin crew member was required, so I returned to the office. After getting in touch with a cabin crew member who was staying in a layover hotel, I asked her to go to the airport immediately, and at last, Flight XXX was able to depart. Since I was so occupied with finding someone to serve as a replacement as the airport curfew time was imminent, I calculated the total duty period of the said alternate cabin crew member for the date incorrectly, misjudging that the rest period she had in the hotel might be counted out from the duty period. In fact, I was so obsessed with the thought that the fully-booked flight should depart as scheduled that I wasn't thinking of anything else.

• **KAIRS Comment :**

The personnel in charge of cabin scheduling violated the legal regulations on the minimum rest period for this case due to a miscalculation of the flight duty period. This miscalculation appears to have been due to the fact that she was under pressure in the situation, as the fight could not depart as scheduled without the commitment of an alternate cabin crew member, and she was not fully acquainted with the criteria for calculating the flight duty period.

Even though said alternate cabin crew member violated the regulations as she accepted the flight duty assigned by a AOC holder during her rest period, such violation also appears to be attributable to the fact that she was not fully acquainted with the criteria for calculation of fight duty period/rest period and didn't know that accepting overtime flight duty itself was a violation of the regulations. To prevent violations of this sort, it is necessary to establish an automatic calculation system that not only enables cabin crew to calculate their flight duty period accurately, but can also be freely accessed by the cabin crew.

Besides, at the time of indoctrinating scheduling personnel, it is necessary to emphasize the dangerous effects of crew fatigue on flight safety, as well as the fact that willful misconduct that violates safety requirements is never acceptable.Finally, it appears to be necessary to reinforce the indoctrination for cabin crew in Section 8.4.9.3 (Flight duty period and rest period) of "Flight Safety Regulations for aeroplanes" in order to make them acquainted with the criteria for calculation of flight duty period and rest period, and aware that the acceptance of overtime flight duty is itself a violation of regulations. For your reference, here are the regulations with regard to flight duty period.

※ Regulations for Flight Duty Period of Cabin Crew (Flight Safety Regulations for aeroplanes)

8.2.1 Terms and Definitions

10) "Flight Duty Period" refers to the total time taken from when the flight crew reports the commencement of duty consisting of a single sector or 2 or more consecutive sectors to when the engine of the aircraft finally stops after the flight of the final section is completed.

Note. Time taken for the crew member leaving his or her home (or place of accommodation) to arrive at the location designated by the operator shall not be included in the flight duty period.

8.4.9.3 Duty and Rest Periods

A. AOC holder shall comply with the following to ensure proper fatigue control for flight crew, cabin crew and flight dispatchers.
  1) Flight duty of flight crew and cabin crew shall not exceed the standards set forth in Annexed Table 8.4.9.3.
  4) Action shall be taken to ensure sufficient rest for flight crew, cabin crew and flight dispatcher right before a scheduled flight.
  5) At least 24 consecutive hours of rest period shall be guaranteed to flight crew, cabin crew and flight dispatchers in a period of 7 consecutive days.

B. Flight crew, cabin crew and flight dispatchers shall comply with the following.
  1) Personnel who fail to have the minimum required rest period set forth in Annexed Table 8.4.9.3 after his or her duty shall not be engaged in flight duty for an air transport business.
  2) During the rest period, no flight duty assigned by a AOC holer shall be accepted.
  3) Flight crew, cabin crew and flight dispatchers shall have at leat 8 hours of rest right before a scheduled flight.
  4) Crew shall take sufficient rest during their rest period provided before a flight duty.

Annexed Table 8.4.9.3 Duty and Rest Periods

E. Criteria for duty period and rest period of cabin crew are as shown below.

Shortened rest time for cabin crew consequential to additional boarding of cabin crew				
Duty period planned (hours)	Additional cabin crew required	Rest period	Shortened rest period approved	Next rest period when the current rest period is shortened
14 or below	0	8	8	10
14-16	1	12	10	14
16-18	2	12	10	14
18-20	3	12	10	14

Note 1. Air carrier should take necessary action to ensure at least 24 consecutive hours of rest in 7 consecutive days for cabin crew.

Note 2. An exception to this requirement can be made when the minimum required rest period cannot be provided for reasons of maintenance, natural disasters, or bad weather.

KAIRS Report

Carry-on Baggage Management



〈Report Details〉
Although the pulley handle strap (fabric strap used for separation or external securing of exit door) of the exit in the cabin was removed, the cabin crew did not recognize this, and the flight was operated without any complementary measures. In addition, with the strap cover opened, the seats next to the exit at issue were fully taken, and the cover and the pulley strap were swinging throughout the flight.

• KAIRS Comment :
It appears that the handle strap mentioned here was mounted on the bottom of the narrow-body window exit, and that said handle strap might have been removed for maintenance purposes during the maintenance operation, rather than for emergency purposes. In addition, pursuant to the Aviation Safety Act, cabin crew are required to brief passengers on how to open the exit door in an emergency situation before take-off.

Given the above, even if the handle strap was seen by the passenger as the handle strap cover was not fixed, the degree of danger affecting cabin safety does not seem to be significant. However, it also appears that the cabin crew overlooked the state of the exit doors even though they were required to check them carefully when inspecting the condition of the emergency equipment right after boarding the aircraft. Moreover, the situation was such that could be corrected by the maintenance crew without hurry after landing by writing it down in the CDL (Cabin Discrepancy List); in fact, it appears to have been possible to fix it just by pressing it by hand if unavoidable.

In conclusion, the condition of the exit at issue should have been checked at the time of inspecting emergency equipment right after boarding, and if such defect had been found, such incident should have been reported without delay to take corrective action. In addition, any defect found in the cabin facilities or safety equipment during flight should be written down on the CDL (Cabin Discrepancy List), rather than by making an oral report, to ensure proper maintenance.

KAIRS Contribution

New Brace Position In International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Manual (Doc.10086)

In aircraft accidents, most casualties occur in the impact stage at the time of the crash. Passengers, by taking the brace position, can protect their heads and legs and secure mobility to escape from the aircraft by themselves. Airline carriers provide pictorial information about the brace position on the briefing card furnished in the seat pocket. ICAO developed better brace positions for cabin crew and passengers and posted them in its Doc.10086 (Manual on Information and Instructions for Passenger Safety) published in 2018.

<Figure 1> Brace position in forward-facing cabin crew seats



<Figure 2> Brace position in rear-facing cabin crew seats

<Figure 3> Forward-facing passenger seats equipped with lap strap seat belt only



<Figure 4> Positions to Avoid

* Seat belt must be fastened and the belt should not be twisted to increase the shock absorption.

For the safety of cabin crew and passengers, it is necessary to promptly incor–orate the newly-developed brace position into cabin crew safety indoctrination, update the passenger briefing card, and include the new brace position in the passenger briefing video before take-off to make passengers aware of the relevant information.

ASRS Report (Call Back)

From NASA's ASRS(Aviation Safety Reporting System)

The FAA Advisory Circular 90-48D, "Pilot's Role in Collision Avoidance,"showed that from January 2009 through December 2013, a total of 42 midair collisions occurred in the United States. During this same time period, there were 461 reported Near Midair Collisions (NMACs). Statistics indicate that the majority of these midair collisions and NMACs occurred in good weather and during daylight hours. ASRS has received many reports of both NMACs and critical ground conflicts. Incidents have occurred in all shapes and sizes, and in good weather or bad.

Contributing factors are numerous. Fatigue and lack of situational awareness have often been observed. Errors in judgment and faulty decisions have been commonly identified, while poor communication and noncompliance with regulations have also been widely reported. The growing number of conflicts with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), or drones, has been a relatively recent development.

This month, CALLBACK shares NMAC and critical ground conflict reports that reveal the serious nature of the phenomena and the tragic consequences that could result. Our intent is to stimulate pilot awareness and discussion of Near Midair Collisions and critical ground conflicts toward the goal of eliminating collisions and reducing the number of conflicts in the air and on the ground.

ASRS Report (Call Back)

Clouded Layers

A CRJ-700 Captain experienced an NMAC while operating in instrument conditions in the Atlanta Class B Airspace. Had the TCAS been inoperative or the pilot not immediately complied with the advisory, the conflict could have been worse.

■ We were flying the downwind leg of the HOBTT TWO ARRIVAL, Runway 27L transition, between FOGER and HITTT intersections, descending from 7,000 feet to 3,000 feet. At approximately 3,800 feet, TRACON amended our assigned altitude to 3,500 feet. I acknowledged the clearance and warned TRACON that we would likely dip slightly below the new assigned altitude in the process of capturing 3,500 feet.

TRACON responded, "That's fine,"and advised us of VFR traffic to the northeast of us at 3,000 feet. I do not recall the distance to the traffic at the initial call. We briefly descended to 3,300 feet but quickly

recovered to 3,500 feet. A few seconds later, a TCAS target appeared at our 11 o'clock position, 5 miles distant, 300 feet below us, and climbing. The Pilot Flying (PF) sighted the aircraft a few seconds before I did, and a moment later we received a "CLIMB"1,500 feet-per-minute TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA). The PF complied with the RA immediately. At this point I got a good look at the target, rolling into a right bank. According to the TCAS, the Beechcraft flew 100 feet below us with no lateral separation.

After receiving, "CLEAR OF CONFLICT"from TCAS, TRACON cleared us to descend to 3,000 feet, and we continued the arrival and approach. We were between layers at the time of this event. It did not appear that the TRACON Controller working us at the time was communicating with the Beechcraft—we never heard any radio traffic to or from that aircraft. I can't imagine how the operator of the Beechcraft thought VFR flight through the Atlanta Class B [Airspace] in marginal conditions was a good idea.

ASRS Report (Call Back)

What You Can't See – Can Hurt You

This air taxi Captain was diligent to mitigate situational threats during the approach at this non-towered airport. Nearing the runway an unexpected hazard emerged, and a potential accident was averted.

■ Heavy snow was falling in the area of my intended destination, and runways were closed by NOTAM. I, as Captain, and a…First Officer were scheduled to fly, and the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) showed weather to improve. We called the airport,…and they confirmed that about 8 inches of snow had fallen and that they were in the process of clearing it. The weather improved, and we were released by…Dispatch.

One runway was opened, though one remained closed by NOTAM. We called the airport and verified the airport condition of one inch or less plowed snow and that a runway was open. The initial part of the flight was uneventful, and we requested an RNAV Approach utilizing Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) minimums.

Center verified that one runway was closed, but one runway was open. We began the approach and checked again with UNICOM regarding runway condition (plowed and open). The Pilot Monitoring (PM) made at least three CTAF calls that I can recall. Upon reaching minimums, the first approximately 1,000 feet of the runway was clearly visible, and descent for normal landing was initiated. Shortly afterward, a dark vehicle that looked like a snow plow was observed about 500 feet down the runway, halfway on the east side moving toward the runway threshold.

Both I and the First Officer observed the vehicle. We executed a missed approach and queried UNICOM about the status of the runway. Shortly afterward, they said that the runway was now clear.

A subsequent approach resulted in a missed approach due to deteriorating conditions. Visibility at this time was reported below our applicable minimums, and we went to our alternate. At the time it only seemed like an inconvenience, but we were incredibly fortunate that the vehicle was not further down the runway where it was not yet visible and where our ability to avoid a collision [would have been] minimized.

ASRS Report (Call Back)

A Defining Moment

A B737 crew was departing after an Embraer 145 had just landed on, and exited, a parallel runway. A conflict developed as the two aircraft approached each other during the high workload environment.

From the B737 First Officer's Report:
■ Because of the wind gusts and rain, we elected to make a maximum thrust takeoff on Runway 06L,… which gave us a V1 speed of approximately 111 knots. We were cleared for takeoff, and everything was normal. Aircraft were landing on Runway 06R, and at V1 speed, I noticed an Embraer 145 that had landed clearing onto taxiway D3.… It was supposed to hold short of our runway, but at approximately 130 to 140 knots, we could see that it had missed its hold short area. If the aircraft continued onto our runway, I think we could have rotated and cleared it, but it would have been close.

The Tower called for them to stop, and they did so just on the edge of our runway. I steered our aircraft just to the left of centerline to give us some extra room, and we took off at our normal rotate speed. After we changed frequency, ATC asked us a couple of questions, and we continued to destination without other incident.

From the Embraer 145 Captain's Report:
■ The flight was involved in a runway incursion…on high speed exit taxiway D3 (Hotspot 5) from Runway 06R toward Runway 6L (stopped past a runway hold short marking) while a B737 was rotating from Runway 06L. We taxied to our parking terminal after the runway was cleared.

We were slowing down to a safe taxi speed on Runway 06R from the ILS Runway 06R approach and landing. As I was taking over the aircraft from the FO…at around 80 knots, ATC instructed us to plan to exit on high speed D3 (hotspot 5) and hold short of Runway 06L, which my FO [read] back correctly and I acknowledged. Both windshield wipers were at high speed due to moderate precipitation. As we were exiting on D3, I asked my FO to run the After Landing Checklist after we had cleared the runway. I had noticed that the B737 was on the [takeoff] roll on Runway 06L, but my primary concern at that high speed exit…was to be on center line (I do not recall if green taxi lights were on) on taxiway D3 and identifying the hold short line or lights for Runway 06L on D3. ATC called, "Stop,"as I was slowing to taxi speed to keep looking for the hold short line on Taxiway D3.…

The FO was finishing up the After Landing Checklist. We immediately stopped the aircraft on D3 before the runway and saw the B737 lifting off from the takeoff roll. It seems [that the] hold short lines for the adjacent parallel runway come up quicker than I was expecting to see them, even though I have reviewed the Jeppesen publications for special pages and the airport diagram. [I should] pay more attention to reviewing the airport taxi plan and diagram. [I should also] stop the aircraft any time [I am] in doubt on a taxiway. Enhancing visual references for the hold short line on such a short intersecting taxiway [would be helpful].

CHIRP Report (Feed Back)

From CHIRP(Aviation and Maritime Confidential Incident Reporting)

Information Overload

Report Text:
Every day when I come to work I am presented with a thick pad of NOTAMs relating to the flight I am about to undertake. With a 1 hour report and a need to be on the aircraft about 30 minutes before departure, there is absolutely no way any pilot can sensibly read and assimilate the volume of data presented. Very often the information is 'coded' or in poor English making the task even harder. Almost without exception crews only read the NOTAMs related to Destination and alternates. Within the on-board information (in the case of my company, LIDO documentation) - increasingly, airports are using the Airport Operational Information (AOI) pages of the airport plates to replicate NOTAMs or give the air traffic manual for the destination. For example, Malaga currently 19 pages and Barcelona 12 pages. There is absolutely no way a pilot can reasonably read and retain that volume of information and there is a great danger of something important being lost in 'noise'.

Obviously, a portion of the cruise is spent preparing for the arrival but with multi-sector days (or a diversion) it simply cannot be reasonable to expect anyone to absorb that volume of data.

There must be a better way to present the data and minimise the risk of confusion and data being missed? In discussion with colleagues, there is a strong feeling that the intent is to absolve authority of responsibility in the event of an issue arising because 'the information was there and you should have seen it'.

CHIRP Comment:
The reporter highlights 2 related problems: the presentation of relevant NOTAMs and the amount of information placed in AOI pages of on-board documentation. There are a number of work strands seeking to address the issues including a survey conducted by the Flight Service Bureau – an airline cooperative – and Eurocontrol has been working for a number of years on a project called Digital NOTAM. The CAA has also identified problems with NOTAM proliferation, relevance and presentation as risks to be investigated and mitigated by its International Group.

The presentation of NOTAM information is a global challenge and there are several reasons, for example Q-codes and their use, as to why managing and presenting them is problematic. There are several commercial applications which display NOTAMS graphically and, as long as they source the information from the approved provider, they can be used for flight planning purposes. There is also work going on at ICAO to address this issue, but this will be a longer term project. The CAA will be reviewing their requirements to provide a more user-friendly display of NOTAM

information online and discussing these with NATS.

The AOI pages are consolidated AIP information which is generally provided from the AIP by the charting company; this can be tailored by the Operator but usually at cost. The counter challenge is how to make crews aware of AIP information in a simple manner – again this is a fine balance and if the airport creates a great deal of information then the crew are obliged to see it or have it available. This issue needs to be managed at operator level.

While the efforts to improve the NOTAM system are welcome – urgency is required. It is to be hoped that the nearly disastrous incident at San Francisco, when an aircraft narrowly avoided landing on a taxiway, may provide the impetus to make genuine and rapid progress. Inadequacies in the presentation of information to the flight crew were identified in the NTSB investigation report (an abstract available by following this link) which included the following recommendation to the FAA:

Establish a group of human factors experts to review existing methods for presenting flight operations information to pilots, including flight releases and general aviation flight planning services (pre-flight) and aircraft communication addressing and reporting system messages and other in-flight information; create and publish guidance on best practices to organize, prioritize, and present this information in a manner that optimizes pilot review and retention of relevant information; and work with air carriers and service providers to implement solutions that are aligned with the guidance.

Unfortunately, with no early solution in sight, pilots must continue to work through the difficulties with the current NOTAM system and be meticulous in checking for relevant NOTAMS for every flight.

CHIRP Report (Feed Back)

Unsafe Operating Procedures

Report Text:
My employer limits inexperienced pilots on single-aisle Airbus to Flap Full landings until they have completed approximately 6 months of line flying. On the Airbus A321 During initial line training [inexperienced pilots] can conduct take-offs and landings on A321 but after completion of their initial line check they may not conduct take-offs or landings on A321 aircraft for the first 6 months or so of line flying. With particular reference to the A321 restriction but equally the flap full limitation on the A319/320, pilots are being allowed to operate as part of the minimum crew complement whilst being deemed unsafe to actually land the aircraft. If I, as Commander, should become incapacitated, it is up to the other crew member to deal with the situation. This would obviously include landing the aircraft.

I have been concerned, since the introduction of this operating limit, that the training department is allowing crew onto the line without the required competency or confidence to fully operate the aircraft. Passing the final line check onto type should surely mean that the crew member is safe and able to take-off and land the aircraft. Whilst I fully understand the steep learning curve of a newly qualified pilot fresh out of training and released to the line, it is concerning that the minimum standard expected does not include the ability to take-off and land the aircraft once out of training.

Operator Comment:
The operator commented that its policy is common with other UK operators and was only brought in after discussion with other airlines. There were a series of issues with new pilots struggling with alternative Flap settings on all single aisle Airbus aircraft and with landing the A321 regardless of Flap setting.

It was decided to give some opportunity for consolidation of the standard landing technique by ensuring consistency of 'the picture'outside the window for a period of around 6 months. Following this, variability is introduced during line continuation training with a trainer who will have additional training in intervention and considerably more experience than the average line Captain in exercising intervention skills and in delivering teaching techniques.

In the unlikely event of an incapacitation on an A319/A320 then the co-pilot can perform a full flap landing and in an A321 the normal A320 landing technique will provide a perfectly safe landing, the difference in technique is not that significant. This policy is designed wholly on the basis of delivering support to new pilots as a consequence of feedback from them and our [the operator's] own observations of their performance. So far it has been very successful.

CHIRP Comment:
The CAA is content with the operator's policy which serves the purpose of minimising the risks of a potential tail strike until inexperienced FOs can consolidate their landings in the first 6 months of flying.

Aviation News

Fatal Metroliner Crash Due Loss Of Control After Pilot Continued Into Adverse Weather

A Swearingen Metro cargo plane, operating Key Lime Air flight LYM308, was destroyed during a descent and subseque1nt inflight breakup near Camilla, Georgia, USA. The pilot, the sole occupant, was killed.

The aircraft departed Panama City, Florida at 20:54 CST (02:54 UTC Dec. 6) on a flight to Albany Airport, Georgia. En route the air traffic controller advised the pilot of moderate to extreme precipitation along his planned route of flight and suggested a route of flight that would have had the pilot fly to the northeast for 70 nautical miles to avoid the most severe weather. The pilot responded that he did have enough fuel for such a diversion, but concluded that he would "see what the radar is painting" after the descent to 3,000 mean sea level (msl). Shortly thereafter, the pilot advised the controller that he intended to divert the flight to Tallahassee International Airport (TLH), Florida. The airplane then descended from 7,000 feet msl to 3,700 feet msl before radar and radio contact was lost. The wreckage was scattered over a large area that included a cotton field and dense forest. The debris field was about 2,640 feet in length and 1,500 feet in width.

Probable Cause:
"The pilot's decision to initiate and continue the flight into known adverse weather conditions, which resulted spatial disorientation, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent in-flight breakup"

Travel Tips

Baggage | An A through Z Guide To Enable Perfect Preparation And Measures For Baggage In Air Travel

***How should I prevent and cope with the baggage-related problems that can happen in an air travel?**

Unless you are on a very short trip, bringing baggage on an aircraft is inevitable. But before you pack up there's probably much more that you need to know than you'd expect, such as what items you are not allowed to carry, or what to do if your baggage is missing in a strange place. How should you prepare your baggage to ensure a hassle-free trip? And what should you do if you run into a problem?

1. Choosing the right luggage
While the bag you pick for carry-on isn't too important, it's worth paying a little more attention when picking a bag to be loaded in the aircraft cargo.

First, bags that are normal-looking or too popular should be avoided, because it may cause confusion. Even if you don't mistake your bag for someone else's, another passenger may make a mistake and take your bag before you realize. The best choice is to select a bag which is somewhat uniquely designed. If your bag is too commonly shaped, it would be better to attach additional marks to aid in your identification. Attaching a handkerchief or a unique tag to your bag will reduce the possibility of confusing it with

others. As well, keep in mind that checked baggage is easily broken in the cargo hold. Choose a piece of baggage that is less likely to be broken and that features less protruding wheels. As both the checked baggage and the carry-on baggage are subject to limits in terms of size and weight, you should confirm those with your airline carrier.

2. Erase your old trails
Got a baggage tag or travel agent identification tag left on your bag from a previous trip? Make sure you remove those tags - they could result in your baggage going to the wrong place.

3. Check whether or not baggage fees are extra
In general, checked baggage is free, but an additional fee may be charged for overweight baggage. Low cost carriers generally do not provide a free checked baggage service. And the free baggage service has restrictions. Generally weight restrictions apply, but in some cases, size restrictions apply as well. For this reason, it is important to check with your airline carrier about weight and size restrictions in advance. While this is not the norm in Korea, some US and European airline carriers will charge fees for your checked baggage, so check your airline carrier's rules in advance.

4. Make sure you know what you can't put in your bag
Once the flight begins, the aircraft is relatively vulnerable to any dangerous situation occurring during the flight. For this reason, baggage loaded in the cargo section of the aircraft is subject to strict standards and regulations.

■ **Checked baggage**
Lithium batteries are not allowed to be carried in checked baggage. Matches, lighters and electronic cigarettes are not allowed to be carried in checked baggage as well. Electronic cigarettes are considered a particular hazard, as a number of fire accidents have occurred in the cargo due to such devices.

■ **Carry-on baggage**
Although the aforementioned lithium batteries, lighters, electronic cigarettes or matches are not allowed to be carried in the check baggage, some of them can be carried into the cabin (however, this does not mean that you can use them in the cabin). On the other hand, while there are almost no restrictions on liquid products in checked baggage, no more than 100ml of liquid per container and a total of no more than 1 liter of liquid is allowed to be carried in the cabin. However, liquids purchased at the duty free store can be carried in the cabin if they are stored in a security tamper evident bag (STEB). Of course, dangerous items are not allowed to be carried in the cabin. Knives or needles are prohibited as they can be used for acts of terrorism. These are allowed in checked baggage.

5. Be careful of theft of carry-on items
Carry-on baggage is generally stored in the cabin shelf. While it's easy to watch your carry-on baggage during a short trip, on a long flight you will likely take a nap at some point. It is even more difficult to take care of your baggage if it is stored on a cabin shelf that is not close to your seat. As incidents of carry-on item theft have been frequently occurring recently, it is recommended to carry your valuables on your person.

6. If your baggage didn't arrive
At the baggage claim (BCA) after a pleasant flight, your baggage doesn't come out, no matter how long you wait. Probably something is wrong. What should you do in this case?

First, you can notify the personnel in charge at your airline carrier that your baggage didn't arrive, fill in a property irregularity report (PIR), and leave your contact number, then your baggage will be delivered to you when it arrives. A good idea is to take a picture of your baggage before checking it in – this makes it easier to make a report. If you are on an overseas trip, you may be able to be paid a baggage delay compensation to purchase daily necessities, as you might have packed them in your checked baggage. In the past, baggage compensation used to be limited to loss or damage, but as the recently amended consumer dispute resolution standards specify that even a simple delay should be compensated, you should check whether you are eligible for such compensation.

-Source: www.airtravelinfo.kr (Air travel information)-

Common Aviation Knowledge

Why You Should Watch Carefully And Follow The Instructions On The Safety Demonstration Video – A Big Tragedy That Could Have Been Avoided With Life Jackets

One of the first things you see after you board the plane is the safety demonstration. If the aircraft is equipped with monitors, a video is played; if not, the cabin crew will demonstrate the safety instructions for emergency situations.

These instructions provide the rules that need to be followed for safety, such as that you have to fasten your seat belt while you are seated, or that you should not smoke in the cabin. One of them is how to put on the safety jacket in an emergency. They instruct you to hang it around your neck, fasten the belt, pull the string to fill the jacket up with gas and blow it up with your mouth if the jacket is not fully inflated. They never forget to say that you should only inflate the jacket just before you escape the aircraft. This is important information, as there was once a big tragedy in which more than 100 people lost their lives in an aircraft accident due to inflating their safety jackets too early.

■ Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961
On November 23, 1996, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961 was hijacked en route from Addis Ababa to Nairobi by 3 hijackers who were threatening to blow the aircraft up. These hijackers were claiming that they had been political prisoners, and were seeking asylum in a safe third country. They demanded the plane be flown to Australia, but the pilot rejected their demand as the fuel was insufficient. After they theatened to blow up the aircraft, the pilot pretended to fly to Australia, but actually followed the African coastline, waiting for a chance to land at a nearby airport.
However, the hijackers obstinately demanded he fly towards Australia. Eventually, as the plain was out of fuel, the pilot decided to make an emergency landing at the Comoros' main airport, but a fight with the hijackers at the last minute caused the pilot to ditch the aircraft in the waters off a nearby beach. The aircraft failed to withstand the flight velocity impact, its wings and fuselage were heavily damaged, and the fuselage started to sink rapidly. As the location where the emergency landing took place was a resort beach, there were a lot of residents and tourists there to witness the scene of the emergency landing. As many people were trying to rescue the passengers from the aircraft, it was expected that a large number could be rescued, with the exception of those who had lost their lives due to the impact. However, despite this favorable situation, there were 125 fatalities. Given that there had only been 175 crew and passengers on the plane, this was a shocking tragedy, as two thirds of them were killed.

■ Panicked passengers inflated their life jackets in the cabin.
Ironically, the second cause of this tragedy was the life jacket, one of the key escape equipment. Although the wings and fuselage were partially damaged as the aircraft had ditched in the sea, many of the passengers survived the initial crash. But when they realized the aircraft had ditched in the water, they started to hurry to put their life jackets on. In panic, they disregarded or did not hear the crew's warning not to inflate their life jackets inside the aircraft, causing them to be pushed against the ceiling of the fuselage by the inflated life jackets when water flooded in. Although they were given instructions from the cabin crew about how to use the life jacket before the departure, they did not follow the instructions. As they were so panicked, they forgot what they had been instructed, and disregarded the instructions from the crew, inflating their life jackets in the cabin.

Island residents and tourists, including a group of scuba divers, approached the aircraft to rescue passengers, but the passengers were unable to escape and were drowned, resulting in a total of 125 fatalities. As shown in other aviation accidents, it is absolutely critical to follow the instructions from the crew in charge of safety in an emergency. No matter how forcefully cabin crew tell passengers to leave their belongings behind after an emergency landing, there are in fact few passengers who actually follow such instructions. We should never forget that the reason why cabin crew, who are always smiling at you and providing the best service in a normal situation, are desperately yelling out at you in an emergency is to save as many lives as possible. For the sake of your life, you MUST listen to the cabin crew in an emergency.

-Source: www.airtravelinfo.kr (Air travel information)-

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